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Preface
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) becomes a greater threat when 
accompanied by the proliferation of effective means of delivery. Proliferator nations are acquir-
ing the means of delivery—most threateningly, ballistic and cruise missiles. (Ballistic missiles 
are powered only for the first part of their flight; thereafter, they coast on a ballistic trajectory. 
Cruise missiles are powered for their entire flight.)
Defenses against missiles can help protect friends and allies from missile attack. The pros-
pect of such protection can reduce the incentive for potential proliferators to acquire WMD 
and their delivery systems. Once proliferation has occurred, missile defenses can reduce the 
expected effects of proliferators’ forces and thus help deter aggression.
These benefits will be lost, or at least reduced, if proliferators can acquire effective coun-
termeasures against missile defenses. Such countermeasures, when incorporated in an attack-
er’s missile or employed in conjunction with such a missile, are known as penetration aids, 
referred to here as penaids. The subject of this documented briefing is an approach to hinder-
ing the proliferation of cruise missile penaids, specifically by adding certain classes of penaid-
relevant items and subitems to the Missile Technology Control Regime. A recent study by the 
same authors developed a similar approach to controlling the proliferation of ballistic missile 
penaids; the results of that study were published in Penaid Nonproliferation: Hindering the 
Spread of Countermeasures Against Ballistic Missile Defenses, 2014, available at http://www.rand.
org/pubs/research_reports/RR378.html.
This documented briefing was prepared in 2013–2014 under the Naval Postgraduate 
School research task “Cruise Missile Penaid Nonproliferation: New Measures to Dissuade 
WMD Proliferation and Reinforce Deterrence.” It should be of interest to individuals and 
organizations concerned with missile defense and with missile and WMD nonproliferation.
This research was sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and conducted 
within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense 
Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the 
Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
For more information on the International Security and Defense Policy Center, see http://
www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp.html or contact the director (contact information is pro-
vided on the web page).
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This research describes an approach to hindering the spread of countermeasures against 
cruise missile defenses. (Such countermeasures, when incorporated in an attacker’s missile or 
employed in conjunction with such a missile, are called penetration aids, or penaids.) This 
approach involved compiling an unclassified list of penaid-relevant items that might be subject 
to internationally agreed-upon export controls.
The list is designed to fit into the export-control structure of the current international 
policy against the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. 
This policy, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), sets rules agreed to by 34 gov-
ernments for restricting the export of items, listed in a technical annex.
This report recommends controls on 18 penaid-relevant items and subitems. Because 
cruise missile penaids can have applications either not restricted by the MTCR (e.g., for 
manned aircraft) or subject only to the regime’s less rigorous controls (e.g., for relatively small 
cruise missiles), the report recommends that the 18 items be subject to case-by-case export 
reviews under MTCR procedures. To be effective, these less rigorous controls will require ener-
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Th e funds for this research were provided by the Defense Th reat Reduction Agency and 
administered by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts 
for Combating WMD.
More than three dozen individuals from the organizations listed in slide 1 and from 
among the RAND Corporation’s own technical specialists provided guidance for this research. 
Th e organizations were the U.S. Department of State (DoS), the Defense Technology Security 
Administration (DTSA), the Offi  ce of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the U.S. Department 
of Commerce (DoC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Air and Space 
Intelligence Center (NASIC), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory, 
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), armed services contractors serving on 
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the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO), and Dennis Gormley, 
the most published authority on the threat of cruise missile proliferation.
Individuals from almost all participating organizations attended a January 29, 2014, 
workshop at RAND to review and comment on preliminary findings. On the basis of sugges-
tions made in the workshop, the authors extensively revised the draft of this report. Thanks for 
assistance with the research and manuscript preparation go to Christopher Lynch, Gail Kouril, 
Elizabeth Hammes, and Alex Chinh at RAND. Particular credit is due to Rebecca Gibbons, 
a RAND Stanton Nuclear Security fellow, for her organization of the workshop and to Jurgen 
Gobien of SAIC and Ryan Henry of RAND for their careful review of multiple drafts. How-
ever, this report reflects only the views of its RAND authors and not necessarily those of any 
other individuals or any organization.
1CHAPTER ONE
Cruise Missile Penaid Nonproliferation
Research Objective 
• Assist U.S. agencies to hinder the spread of
countermeasures against cruise missile defenses.
• Do this by developing an unclassified list of penaid-
relevant items that might be subject to internationally
agreed-upon export controls.
2 
Th is research was designed to assist U.S. agencies charged with generating policies to discour-
age the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and cruise missile delivery sys-
tems. Th e objective was to develop new measures to restrict the proliferation of countermea-
sures (also known, when incorporated in or used with an attacker’s missiles, as penetration 
aids, or penaids) against cruise missile defenses.
It is necessary to identify the science and technology underpinning the development of 
penaids before policies can be designed to control the threat. Th erefore, the research team 
focused on answering the following overarching research question: What technologies and 
equipment, if proliferated, would constitute an emerging cruise missile penaid threat to the 
United States, its allies, partners, and others?
R
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A recent study by the same authors developed a similar approach to controlling the pro-
liferation of ballistic missile penaids; the results of that study were published in Penaid Non- 
proliferation: Hindering the Spread of Countermeasures Against Ballistic Missile Defenses, 2014, 
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR378.html. 






• Follow-up literature review and interviews
3 
Th e RAND National Defense Research Institute drew on its expertise in the several subjects 
relevant to the project: U.S. cruise missile defense systems; domestic and foreign development 
of penetration aids and related technology and equipment; relevant U.S. aerospace systems, 
technologies, and industry; and related proliferation/nonproliferation matters. RAND analysts 
conducted a literature review and interviews to identify data sources and solicit the perspec-
tives of leading government and nongovernment experts in subjects relevant to the project. Th e 
research team conducted structured interviews and an independent technical assessment to 
develop a preliminary characterization of the technologies and equipment most critical to the 
emerging cruise missile penaid threat. Th ereafter, the team invited a selected group of experts 
to participate in a one-day workshop to review the initial characterization of penaid technolo-
gies and equipment.
R
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Policy Refinements to the Objective 
• Fullest possible list
• MTCR format
• Technology, not policy
• Be specific or be general
• Not considered: Wassenaar Arrangement
4 
Interviewees for this research and the previous research on ballistic missile penaids suggested 
several refi nements to the project. One was to develop a broad list of penaid-related items from 
which the most important might later be selected.
Another was to put these items in the format of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR), the international instrument for hindering the spread of WMD-capable missiles. 
Th irty-four governments currently subscribe to the provisions of the MTCR. Th e MTCR 
Annex (MTCR, 2013) is a control list of items presented in a format usable by government 
export-control offi  cials.
A third suggestion was to focus exclusively on penaid-relevant technology, not on policy 
questions. Th is was easier said than done, however. For example, as discussed later, the place-
ment of items on the MTCR Annex determines the degree to which the export of such items 
will be restricted. Consequently, although this report focuses on technology, it also identifi es 
inescapable policy questions.
Many suggestions focused on a dilemma: whether to be specifi c enough in describing 
penaid-related items so that export-control offi  cials could know precisely what to control or 
whether to discuss such items in more general terms to avoid unintended information transfer 
to proliferators. Th e project team used an approach that took into account both concerns by 
describing specifi c systems and subsystems in broad terms.
Finally, some interviewees suggested that, in addition to using the MTCR format, the 
project should use that of the Wassenaar Arrangement, another international regime with a 
control list (see WA, 2014). In the words of the WA website, 
R
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The Wassenaar Arrangement has been established in order to contribute to regional and 
international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility 
in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing 
destabilising accumulations. 
However, the WA is less restrictive than the MTCR. For that reason, the research team 
believes that items suggested for the MTCR could be adapted—with a loss of stringency of 
control—for the WA but that items added to the WA could not be as readily adapted for the 
MTCR.
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Unique Aspects of Cruise Missile Penaids  
• vs. ballistic missiles
– atmospheric operation
– variable flight path
– efficiency for chemical/biological weapon delivery
• vs. manned aircraft




– treated identically by the MTCR
5 
Th e proliferation threat posed by cruise missiles has long been recognized (see Gormley, 2008; 
McMahon and Gormley, 1995; and Speier and Gormley, 2003). Cruise missiles or unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) are the by far the most effi  cient means of delivering chemical or bio-
logical agents because the vehicles can release the agents in a patterned manner. And defenses 
against cruise missiles are still at a relatively primitive stage of development.
Although the subjects of this report and Penaid Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread 
of Countermeasures Against Ballistic Missile Defenses are both penaids, features of cruise missile 
penaids diff er in important respects from those of ballistic missile penaids.
Th e operation of cruise missile penaids is strongly aff ected by both the atmosphere in 
which they operate and the eff ects of gravity on their fl ight paths and dispersal. In contrast, 
ballistic missile penaids—except those designed to operate endoatmospherically—are deployed 
in space with no air resistance and with an apparent lack of gravity (because all elements of the 
penaids coast on a ballistic trajectory). So, the technologies of cruise missile penaids and bal-
listic missile penaids are generally quite diff erent.
Moreover, the launch points and fl ight trajectories of cruise missiles and their penaids 
are highly variable—indeed, unpredictable—with respect to geography and their orientation 
vis-à-vis cruise missile defenses. Ballistic missile penaids are generally more predictable in their 
trajectories.
In contrast to ballistic missiles, which deliver their payloads at point targets, cruise mis-
siles can dispense a liquid or powder payload while fl ying in a line perpendicular to the pre-
R
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vailing wind. This means that cruise missiles can be far more efficient at delivering chemical 
or biological agents.
A critical aspect of cruise missile penaids is their similarity to penaids on manned aircraft. 
Because the MTCR explicitly exempts manned aircraft items from its controls, this presents a 
problem in differentiating cruise missile penaids. There are some differences, however. Cruise 
missiles are generally smaller than manned aircraft, meaning that the size, weight, and power 
of cruise missile penaids will be more limited than that of manned aircraft penaids. In addi-
tion, cruise missile penaids operate autonomously, in contrast to the optional crew controls for 
manned aircraft penaids.
Finally, the relationship of cruise missiles to the broader category of UAVs is critical 
for defining controls. UAVs, even if ostensibly designed to return to their launch sites, can 
be used for munitions delivery and one-way missions. The MTCR has been clear on this 
since the time of its public announcement in 1987, placing identical controls on both uses 
by setting the tightest restrictions on “complete unmanned aerial vehicle systems (including 
cruise missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least a 
500 kg ‘payload’ to a ‘range’ of at least 300 km” (MTCR, 2013, Item 1.A.2). In short, the term 
UAV is more inclusive than cruise missile, but because both can challenge defenses and be used 
in attack modes, this report treats cruise missile penaids and UAV penaids, sometimes called 
“self-protection” (see La Franchi, 2004), interchangeably.
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General Problems with a Cruise
Missile Penaid Control List 
• Relative immaturity of some of the technology
• Utility of some items for manned aircraft and missile
defense itself
• Tension between being general and being specific
• Negotiability
6 
Th ere are several broad problems with developing a list of items to be controlled.
Th e fi rst concerns the relative immaturity of cruise missile defense technology compared 
with ballistic missile defense technology—and the relative immaturity of UAV penaids (or 
“self-protection”) compared with manned aircraft. As these cruise missile-related technologies 
become more fully developed, new penaid-related items may become apparent.
Th e second problem concerns the overlap between cruise missile penaids and those 
on manned aircraft. Th is overlap necessitates some diffi  cult line-drawing to avoid confl icts 
between the MTCR’s restrictions and the prohibition against interfering with exports related 
to manned aircraft. Th is line-drawing is diffi  cult but not impossible. Governments can draw 
on a variety of information sources to help determine the end use of an export. In addi-
tion, as will be explained in greater detail later in this report, targets for testing cruise missile 
defenses can overlap with (or be indistinguishable from) cruise missile penaids, creating a con-
fl ict between permitting defenses, on the one hand, and not proliferating countermeasures to 
those defenses, on the other.
A third problem, previously noted, is defi ning the controls on penaid-related items in suf-
fi cient specifi city to inform export-control personnel without disclosing information that could 
be helpful to proliferators.
Finally, with any international control list, negotiability is a concern. Th e research team 
worked with export-control offi  cials to consider how to address such concerns. Th e main issue, 
to be addressed later in this report, is the level of MTCR restrictions to apply to cruise missile 
penaid-related items.
R
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Candidates for a Control List 
Slide 7 serves as a table of contents for this report. We propose controls on 18 items or subi-
tems and discuss each individually. We propose including these items under the MTCR’s less-
restrictive category, Category II. Th ree of these items—electromagnetic pulse generators, air 
defense communication jammers, and standoff  delivery systems—are more speculative, given 





The Missile Technology Control Regime
How the MTCR Works 
• Designed to prevent the proliferation of
– Rocket systems or UAVs capable of delivering a 500 kg payload
to a range of at least 300 km
   or 
– Any rocket system or UAV intended to deliver WMD
• Two categories
– Category I – items subject to a strong presumption of export
denial
– Category II – items subject to a case-by-case review and no-
undercut rule
• Enforced by international cooperation and/or U.S. sanctions
8 
Th e MTCR seeks to hinder the spread of rockets and UAVs—regardless of purpose 
(e.g., space launch, reconnaissance)—beyond a specifi ed range/payload capability and some-
times only range capability, or regardless of range or payload capability if the systems are 
intended to deliver WMD.
Th e MTCR’s Category I list consists of a relatively small number of items subject to the 
tightest export restrictions. Th e MTCR Guidelines state that such exports, if they occur at all, 
must be “rare” and subject to strong provisions with respect to supplier responsibility.
Th e MTCR’s Category II list consists of items that can be used to manufacture 
Category I items, as well as other missile-related items for potential WMD delivery. Category II 
items are generally dual-use, applicable to purposes other than those related to Category I 
items or WMD delivery. So, Category II exports are subject to greater fl exibility but 
R
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nevertheless require case-by-case export reviews and international procedures to avoid under-
cutting Category II export denials by MTCR partners.
The MTCR has well-developed procedures for sharing export decision information 
among its members. The United States has legislation providing for sanctions against domestic 
and foreign entities that contribute to missile proliferation (see Speier, Chow, and Starr, 2001). 
In addition, there are United Nations Security Council sanctions, particularly against Iran and 
North Korea, that proscribe transfers of items in the MTCR Annex.
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Key MTCR Items Considered in this Study 
• Category II:
– Items 5, 7, and 8 – Reserved for future use
– Item 10 – Flight control
– Item 11 – Avionics
– Item 15 – Test facilities and equipment
– Item 16 – Modeling, simulation, and design integration
– Item 17 – Stealth
– Item 18 – Nuclear effects protection
– Item 19 – Other complete delivery systems
9 
As shown on slide 9, of the 18 classes of items in the MTCR Annex’s Category II, a number of 
items could be relevant for cruise missile penaid controls. Th ere are three blank items on the 
MTCR Annex—Items 5, 7, and 8—that could be used for additional penaid-related hardware 
or technology.
R
14    Cruise Missile Penaid Nonproliferation
Items Also Covered by the MTCR 





Each hardware item listed in the MTCR Annex is generally accompanied by a list of related 
items, shown in slide 10. In particular, design and production technology is treated at least as 
restrictively as the hardware item itself.
R
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Cruise Missile Penaid Subsystems Potentially 
Covered by the Current MTCR 
• Item 11 – Avionics
• Item 17 – Stealth
11 
It can be argued that the current (October 17, 2013) version of the MTCR Annex can be inter-
preted as covering some of the penaid technologies discussed in this report. Th is applies, in 
particular, to the Annex items covering avionics and stealth.
However, some penaid-relevant items are not covered—or not explicitly covered. Later in 
this report, we consider modifi cations to the existing Annex items.
Of note, there is a series of defi nitions early in the MTCR Annex. Th e defi nition of pay-
load includes countermeasure equipment. However, this defi nition does not constitute a con-
trol list. Th e purpose of the defi nition is to standardize the calculation of the mass delivered 
by a missile.
R
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Definitions and Clarifications 
• Cruise Missile Penaid – in this report, countermeasures
carried on or with an attacker's cruise missiles to defeat
missile defenses
• Cruise Missiles, UAVs – in this report, used
interchangeably, but UAVs is the more inclusive term
• Electromagnetic Spectrum – the full radio frequency,
infrared, optical, and ultraviolet spectra (i.e., from about
10-nanometer to 100-meter wavelengths)
12 
Slide 12 defi nes terms used frequently in this report. When these terms are used, they are 
meant with the defi nitions shown.
R
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Category I or Category II? 
• Utility for manned aircraft
• Usability for small UAVs = usability for large UAVs
• Option to include in Item 5 (currently an open item)
13 
Because penaids can increase the off ensive eff ectiveness of cruise missiles, it would be desir-
able to place the tightest MTCR restrictions on penaids for Category I cruise missiles 
(i.e., those capable of delivering a 500-kg payload to a range of 300 km). However, the project 
team was unable to develop a general formula to distinguish such items from those with other 
applications.
First, virtually all cruise missile penaids are at least potentially usable for manned aircraft, 
an application that the MTCR is explicitly prohibited from controlling.
Second, penaids usable for Category II UAVs (with a payload below 500 kg) are poten-
tially usable for Category I UAVs. 
Consequently, a penaid specifi cally usable only on a Category I UAV would have a mass 
of 500 kg or greater and would not be usable on a manned aircraft. Th e project team was 
unable to fi nd evidence that such a penaid is likely to be developed. 
For these reasons, the items described in this report are proposed for the less-restrictive 
but nevertheless signifi cant MTCR Category II controls. Th ese controls require a case-by-
case review to consider the end use of the proposed export—exempting, for example, uses on 
manned aircraft. Chapter Four describes in more detail how Category II controls are applied. 
Th e decision not to recommend applying Category I controls to cruise missile penaids 
was the most diffi  cult of this project. Many specialists wanted Category I restrictions applied 
to one item or another because of their sensitivity. But the project team could fi nd no way to 
apply these restrictions under the current MTCR. 
It should be noted that, if the end use is determined to be WMD delivery, the MTCR 
Guidelines automatically upgrade the item to Category I restrictions. Moreover, for the same 
R
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reasons that penaids for less capable UAVs can be used on more capable ones, this report does 
not recommend limiting penaid controls on the basis of a missile’s range. Consequently, the 
300-km range Category II requirement, which appears in the MTCR Annex (Item 19) does 
not constrain the controls we propose. 
19
CHAPTER THREE




SOURCE: Galileo Avionica promotional image, in Carlo Siardi, Galileo Avionica, “Unmanned Battlefield Aerial Surveillance: 
FALCO Program Updates,” briefing presented at the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Conference, London, March 26, 2004.  
Acoustic 
Laser/electronic support/ 
radar warning receiver 
Redundant 
comm. bus 
Redundant flight controller 
and navigation sensors 
Directional data 
link + encryption 
Reduced radar 
cross-section 
Low engine acoustic 
and infrared emissions 
Redundant actuators 
and control surfaces Chaff/flare dispensers 
Th is report includes illustrations of some of the items suggested for MTCR controls. For exam-
ple, as shown in slide 14, a given UAV or cruise missile may contain many penaid-related 
components.
R
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Selectively Restricted Items:  
Exportable on a Case-by-Case Basis 
• MTCR CATEGORY II
[Note: These items have alternative uses that should not necessarily be 
restricted, such as for manned aircraft or missile defenses themselves.] 
Countermeasure subsystems and penetration aids designed to 
saturate, confuse, evade, or suppress missile defenses, and usable on 
or with unmanned air vehicles, including: 
15 
Slide 15 applies to all candidate MTCR items discussed in this report. Note that some penaid 
items, such as decoys, might not be carried on the UAV itself but may be deployed by another 
vehicle or system in conjunction with the operation of the UAV.
R
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1. Complete Penaids
Countermeasures integrated into complete subsystems for 




Danish Apache Modular Aircraft Self-Protection Equipment (AMASE) 
SOURCE: Terma promotional images. 
Issue: The same countermeasures may be used on manned aircraft or on 
Category I or Category II UAVs. Are Category II case-by-case reviews adequate? 
Nose and aft module set identical 
MWS sensors (6) 
can be AAR-54, 




behind nose  
and aft radomes AMASE pod:  


















MWS sensors (6)  
can be AAR-54, -57, 
or -60(V)2 
Th e most obvious candidate for controls is the complete penaid subsystem. Slide 16 shows an 
integrated penaid on the left and some potential modules on the right.
As discussed earlier, a case-by-case review will be needed to determine whether the com-
plete subsystem is to be used on a UAV or on a manned aircraft. Th is raises the question of 
whether MTCR Category II procedures are adequate for dealing with cruise missile penaids. 
Th is issue applies to all other penaid items proposed for controls and is discussed in more detail 
in Chapter Four.
R
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2. Test Targets
17 
Complete test targets or their subsystems simulating 
countermeasures when observed by missile defense 
sensors 
Issue: Friends and allies may need test targets for training 
and exercises. 
    Serbian rocket-powered test target     Signature control modules 
SOURCE: Photos by Miroslav Gyürösi, courtesy of Jane’s Missiles and Rockets. 
Missile defense test targets simulate off ensive missiles—and, often, penaids. Th ey are used in 
exercises of missile defense sensor and interceptor systems. Such targets create a number of 
proliferation problems. For example, their technologies may be indistinguishable from—or, at 
least, interchangeable with—those of penaids. At a minimum, their development and testing 
off er a perfect cover for the development and testing of the penaids themselves. Consequently, 
they should be restricted in the same manner as complete penaids.
Th ere is much legitimate international cooperation in missile defense, however. And mis-
sile defense capabilities need to be tested against realistic targets. How can international coop-
eration occur if participants do not share test targets?
Th ere are options for resolving this dilemma, all of which have precedents in nonprolif-
eration practice. One is for nations receiving missile defenses to develop their own test targets. 
Th is has the disadvantage of permitting the development of penaid technology. A second pos-
sibility would involve allowing the recipient nation to conduct testing on the supplier’s territory 
to avoid having the supplier export the test targets. Th is would have the additional advantage 
of allowing the recipient of missile defense equipment to forgo developing its own targets and 
testing infrastructure. A third possibility would be for the supplier to maintain jurisdiction or 
control over the test target while it was in the recipient’s territory. Under the MTCR Guide-
lines, if the supplier retains jurisdiction or control, the movement of an item out of the sup-
plier’s territory is not considered a “transfer” (i.e., an export). A fourth, and perhaps most likely, 
possibility takes advantage of the proposed Category II status of the candidates for controls 
discussed in this report: Any proposed export of a test target would be carefully reviewed to 
ensure an acceptable end use and end user.
R
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It should be noted that, if a test target were, in fact, a Category I UAV, it would already 
be covered by Category I MTCR controls.
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2. Test Targets (Cont’d)
18 
Swedish SM-B6 test target 
SOURCE: Enator Miltest AB promotional image. 
Slides 17 and 18 illustrate two of the range of test targets on the market—small in slide 17 and 
large in slide 18. Depending on the sophistication of the test range, virtually all decoys, for 
example, can be construed to be test targets.
R
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3. Decoys
3. Decoys – towed or free-flying, for launch from or with
UAVs 
19 
Raytheon towed decoy 
SOURCE: Raytheon promotional image. 
Decoys can be towed by the cruise missile/UAV or launched by another system. In theory, 
a decoy could be specifi cally designed for a Category I UAV, but the research team was 
unable to defi ne such specifi city. However, a decoy not necessarily specifi cally designed for a 
Category I system, the Miniature Air Launched Decoy-Jammer, is being integrated for use 
with a Category I system, the MQ-9 Reaper UAV (see “Miniature Air-Launched Decoy Inte-
grated onto MQ-9 Reaper,” 2013; Majumdar, 2014; and Jennings, 2013).
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3. Decoys (Cont’d)
3. Decoys – towed or free-flying, for launch from or with
UAVs 
20 
Israeli free-flying decoy 
SOURCE: Israel Military Industries promotional images. 
Amplifiers, active 
radio frequency 
Reflective lens,  
passive radio frequency 
Infrared crucible,  
3 minutes infrared 
signature 
Slide 19 illustrates a towed decoy. Slide 20 illustrates a free-fl ying decoy, with the full unit 
shown on the left and alternative confi gurations on the right.
R
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4. Spectral Flares
Flares designed to match the spectral radiance of the UAV 
• UV to IR range
21 
Spectral fl ares are designed to counter sophisticated heat-seeking defensive missiles that ignore 
emissions not matching those of the off ensive target. Such fl ares match the emissions spectrum 
of the cruise missile and mislead the defensive interceptors into targeting the fl ares rather than 
the off ensive missile. 
R
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5. Electronic Countermeasures
Electromagnetic jammers, spoofers, and supporting 
subsystems designed to counter radar systems, missile 
seekers, missile fuze sensors, defense electronics, or 
defense communications – including: 
22 
Ukrainian Omut-KM airborne pod-mounted self-defense jammer 
SOURCE: Radionix promotional image. 
Th ere is a broad range of electronic countermeasures that are usable as penaids. Th e follow-
ing slides off er a few examples of relevant current or prospective penaids described in the open 
literature. 
It should be noted that there can be functional overlaps between items for which this 
report proposes controls. For example, decoys are physical objects designed to mislead the 
defender, while spoofers are electronic signals with the same ultimate purpose. 
Of particular interest is a jamming pod that has been demonstrated for use, not with a 
cruise missile but with the Category I MQ-9 Reaper UAV (see Carey, 2013).
R
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Electronic Countermeasures (Cont’d) 
5.a. DIRCM 
Directional infrared countermeasures excepting those 
specially designed for manned civil aircraft 
23 
Northrop Grumman DIRCM 
SOURCE: Northrop Grumman promotional image. 
Directional infrared countermeasures (DIRCM) are being installed on both military and civil 
manned aircraft to protect against heat-seeking interceptor missiles (see Military Periscope, 
2013a). Th eir potential use on civil aircraft would be an obvious reason to approve a DIRCM 
export. Such an exception is consistent with a small number of MTCR exemptions for peaceful 
uses of missile-related technologies.
R
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Electronic Countermeasures (Cont’d) 
5.b. DRFM 
Digital radio-frequency memory jammers and spoofers 
24 
Mercury Systems digital radio-frequency memory (DRFM) 
 SOURCE: Mercury Systems promotional image. 
Issue: Add analog RFM? 
Digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) penaids analyze defensive electronic signals and 
transmit new signals to counter the defense (see Mercury Systems, undated; the company is 
one of many manufacturers of these systems). DRFM penaids’ export applications must be 
reviewed with special care. 
It is possible to perform DRFM functions with analog, rather than digital, radio fre-
quency memory. We questioned whether it was important to recommend controls on analog 
radio frequency memory. However, the market has turned decisively in the digital direction.
R
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Electronic Countermeasures (Cont’d)  
5.c. Hot Clutter 
Subsystems producing hot (actively illuminated) clutter, 
such as terrain-bounce jammers   
25 
Normal radar path from 
interceptor to UAV and back 
Stronger radar from UAV reflects off 
Earth toward interceptor to deceive it 
Terrain-bounce jammer 
SOURCE: Adapted from U.S. Patent 5,483,240. 
Hot clutter is a false target illuminated in the wavelengths used by the defense to confuse the 
defending system. It includes chaff  dispensed by the cruise missile and actively illuminated to 
mislead defensive interceptors. Another way to produce hot clutter is with a terrain-bounce 
jammer, which attempts to mislead the defensive interceptor into detecting a nonexistent target 
on the earth’s surface. 
R
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Electronic Countermeasures (Cont’d) 
5.d. Electromagnetic Pulse 
Explosive and non-explosive generators of non-nuclear 
electromagnetic pulses or high-power microwaves 
26 
General view of high-
power spiral MCG:  
(1) spiral MCG; (2) pulsed 
step-up transformer;  
(3) electric power peaking 
unit; (4) load-connection 
unit; (5) MCG triggering 
devices.  
Ukrainian EM pulse generators 
SOURCE: Institute for Electromagnetic Research. Used with permission. 
Electromagnetic pulse devices generate energy to burn out defender electronics. Boeing and 
the U.S. Air Force have tested the Counter-Electronics High-powered Microwave Advanced 
Missile Project (CHAMP; see Jackson, 2012). A Ukrainian fi rm, the Institute for Electromag-
netic Research, advertises such devices. Depending on the design (e.g., an explosive-powered 
generator) and sophistication, an electromagnetic pulse device may need to be separated from 
the off ensive missile to prevent the off ensive missile from committing a self-kill penetration 
attack. Or the device may be carried in a purpose-built escort UAV. In general, electromagnetic 
pulse devices are penaids for the future. 
Slide 26 shows a non–explosively driven pulse generator on the left and an explosively 
driven generator on the right.
R
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Electronic Countermeasures (Cont’d) 
5.e. Communications Jammers 
Onboard or escort flight hardware for jamming cruise 
missile defense communications, e.g., 
• Between search radar and tracking radar
• Between tracking radar and interceptor missile
27 
Communications can be a vulnerability of defensive systems, so these systems are usually digi-
tal, jam-resistant, and highly directional. However, in the future, penaids might be designed 
to counter or deny, disable, or disrupt defense-related communications, as opposed to jamming 
the operations of an interceptor missile.
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6. Reactive Threat Avoidance
Automated reactive threat avoidance subsystems, 
exempting collision-avoidance subsystems 
28 
BAE Systems sense and avoidance subsystem 
SOURCE: BAE Systems promotion image. 
Missile sensors 
begin initial track 





Single sensor  
field of view 
Missile seeker 
field of view 
Missile launch Lock to intercept Missile break lock 
Decoy 
Common interchangeable  
units for all platforms 
Slide 28 illustrates a process that employs several types of hardware. Automated systems can 
direct an off ensive missile to take self-protection actions, such as dispensing decoys or engag-
ing in evasive maneuvers. Reactive threat avoidance systems include both threat-sensing and 
defense mechanisms. However, such systems have the peaceful application of preventing midair 
collisions. A Category II review will be needed to distinguish these end uses.
R
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7. Dispensers/Deployment Mechanisms
Dispensers for chaff, obscurants, and flares as well as 
penetration aid deployment mechanisms for decoys, pulse 
generators, or precision-guided munitions 
29 
UK Vicon 78 flare/chaff dispensers 
SOURCES: (Left) Thales promotional image; (right) W. Vinten Ltd. promotional image. 
Penaids of various types may need to be deployed by the off ensive vehicle. Th is requires dis-
pensers or other deployment mechanisms, like those shown in slide 29.
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8. Maneuverability Features
Flight hardware, including flight control systems and 
sensors, designed to operate at acceleration forces greater 
than 10g sustained  
Issue: Precise parameters and their verification 
30 
One method of penetrating defenses is to outmaneuver defensive interceptors. Rapid maneu-
vers involve accelerations (g-forces) that, if too great, cannot be withstood by human pilots. 
Th e sustained vertical g-force limit for humans is approximately ten times the force of grav-
ity (i.e., 10g; see the Wikipedia entry “G-Force,” 2014, for a guide to standard references). 
Flight hardware for applications above this level can be presumed to be for unmanned aircraft. 
For example, a Russian off ensive missile is reported to be capable of 20–30g maneuvers (see 
Tikhonov, 2014 [in Russian]).
An issue remains with respect to precisely which g-force parameters to use and how to 
calculate them.
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9. Software
Software and/or algorithms specially designed to enable 
UAV tactics, techniques, and procedures, such as evasive 
maneuvers and swarming to penetrate/defeat defensive 
systems 
Issue: Determining functions of software 
31 
Sophisticated software may be designed to enable a cruise missile to evade defenses. Such eva-
sive tactics may include maneuvers (see slide 30) or coordination among several cruise missiles 
to “swarm” a target and overwhelm defenses by force of numbers.
It can be diffi  cult to determine the end use of software. Th is will be a challenge for case-
by-case reviews of Category II software.
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10. Standoff Delivery
of Chemical/Biological Weapons 
Flight vehicle subsystems specially designed for the 
standoff delivery of liquid, gases, or powders – including 
wind velocity profile, turbulence, and inversion layer 





SOURCE: Institute for Electromagnetic Research. 
Used with permission. 
Issue: Complex instrumentation, sensors, and algorithms 
needed for such deployment. Possibly exceeds current 
state of the art for cruise missile application. 
One method for avoiding interception of a chemical or biological agent delivery system is 
for it to release its payload outside the range of the defender’s systems. Th is candidate item 
would optimize the delivery of primarily biological agents by adjusting the release of the agents 
according to local environmental conditions, such as wind direction and the altitude of the 
inversion layer.
Th is is a theoretical penaid, however. A few of the many diffi  culties in developing it 
include the need for near-real-time mapping of the local environment and onboard modeling 
and simulation to determine the appropriate deployment tactics. But placing restrictions on 
this penaid now will help control its proliferation in the future, when the enabling technologies 
may be more readily available.
R
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Already Restricted on a Case-by-Case Basis, 
but Might Be Expanded  
 • See www.mtcr.info/english/annex.html for fuller
descriptions of items on current MTCR control list.
33 
At this point, we shift the discussion from items that could be added to the MTCR to items 
already controlled.
Th e following discussion concerns four penaid-applicable items already included in the 
MTCR Annex. Th is report proposes modifi cations in these items to more fully address cruise 
missile penaids.
R
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1. Supersonic/Low Altitude Avionics
MTCR Item 11.A.1 (Avionics):  
Current text: “Radar and laser radar systems, including 
altimeters, designed or modified for use in [Category I] 
systems.” 
Add precision radar altimeters, forward-looking systems to 
determine terrain elevation, and guidance, navigation, and 
control subsystems that enable supersonic or faster flight 
at altitudes below 30 meters if designed or modified for 
UAVs. 
Issues: Are there any other avionics or supporting sensors 
that enable autonomous supersonic flight below 30 meters 
altitude?   
34 
Avionics and supporting subsystems that permit supersonic or faster fl ight at very low altitudes 
can be used preferentially for unmanned systems. A Russian system is reported to be capable of 
supersonic fl ight at altitudes of a few meters, and there is a Chinese version of the same system 
(see “3M-54 Klub,” 2014).
Th e problem will be to distinguish cruise missile–related end uses of such items from uses 
for manned aircraft.
R
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2. Anti-Jam Equipment
MTCR Item 11.A.3.b.3 (Avionics): 
Current text: “Receiving equipment for Global Navigation Satellite 
Systems (GNSS; e.g., GPS, GLONASS or Galileo) having any of 
the following characteristics, and specially designed components 
thereof: . . . b. Designed or modified for airborne applications and 
having any of the following: . . . 3. Being specially designed to 
employ anti-jam features (e.g., null steering antenna or 
electronically steerable antenna) to function in an environment of 
active or passive countermeasures.” 
Broaden anti-jam subsystems beyond those for global navigation 
satellite systems to all sensor, navigation, and communications 
systems, and add “including multi-mode seekers.”  
Issue:  Add home-on-jam subsystems? 
35 
Defensive systems can attempt to jam the electronics of an off ensive cruise missile. Th e off en-
sive countermeasure is anti-jam equipment. Th e MTCR currently covers only one type of anti-
jam equipment. Th is coverage could be broadened.
One issue is how far to go in controlling anti-jam tactics. Should “home-on-jam” attacks 
on ground-based defensive systems be covered by the MTCR? Or would this extend MTCR 
controls too far in the direction of standard off ensive tactics to suppress defenses? We raise the 
issue here for consideration. We recommend, at least initially, keeping MTCR controls focused 
and not extending them to home-on-jam subsystems.
R
42    Cruise Missile Penaid Nonproliferation
3. Stealth
MTCR Item 17.A.1 (Stealth):  
Current text: “Devices for reduced observables such as radar 
reflectivity, ultraviolet/infrared signatures and acoustic 
signatures (i.e., stealth technology). . . .” 
Change title of Item 17.A.1 from “Stealth” to “Signature Control.” 
Broaden “reduced” observables to “modified observables.” 
Include communications signature reduction, i.e., “low 
probability of detection” and “low probability of intercept.” Add 
plasma clouds and active and passive control of electromagnetic 
signatures (such as emissions from navigation instruments and 
visual signatures) including signature controls that change but 
do not reduce the observables. 
36 
Th e current MTCR’s stealth item is potentially all-inclusive in terms of devices for reduced 
observables. It uses the phrase such as to make clear that the examples mentioned do not defi ne 
the limits of the control.
However, the clarity of the item could be improved by adding additional examples, as 
shown in slide 36. Furthermore, the technology for “reduced” observables can be a subset of 
the technology for “modifi ed” observables (i.e., signature controls that change, but do not nec-
essarily reduce, the signature of the off ensive missile). For that reason, we recommend chang-
ing the title of the item to “Signature Control.”
R
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4. Hardening
MTCR Item 18.A.1 (Nuclear effects protection):   
Current text: “‘Radiation Hardened’ ‘microcircuits’ usable in 
protecting rocket systems and unmanned air vehicles against 
nuclear effects (e.g., Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), X-rays, 
combined blast and thermal effects), and usable for [Category I] 
systems.” 
Broaden to “nuclear and non-nuclear effects protection.” Include 
items specially designed for hardening against non-nuclear 
electromagnetic effects, including non-nuclear electromagnetic 
pulses, high power microwaves, directed energy thermal 
radiation, and laser dazzling. Add coverage for items usable for 
any UAVs. 
37 
Th e MTCR Annex already includes items for hardening against nuclear eff ects. However, it 





Implementing Penaid Export Controls
Implementation 
• Review criteria
• Assessment of intent
• Risk of overloading
• Consensus requirements
38 
Although penaid export controls present some defi nitional and structural issues, such issues are 
familiar matters in the implementation of the MTCR.
For example, the problem of diff erentiating between appropriate and inappropriate uses 
of dual-use items is broadly addressed by the MTCR’s case-by-case review procedures, which 
apply the following six criteria (see MTCR, undated):
A. Concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
B. Th e capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient state;
C. Th e signifi cance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of delivery systems 
(other than manned aircraft) for weapons of mass destruction;
R
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D. The assessment of the end use of the transfers, including relevant assurances of the 
recipient state;
E. The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements;
F. The risk of controlled items falling into the hands of terrorist groups and individuals.
Some of these criteria involve tests of intent (e.g., “objectives,” “assessment of the end use,” 
“assurances”). Countermeasure equipment usable for both manned aircraft and cruise missiles 
(such as chaff dispensers and electronic jammers) can be reviewed for export using the above 
criteria. Moreover, the process of review involves more than these criteria. Governments can 
bring to bear information from intelligence, diplomatic, technical, and commercial sources, 
and they have a variety of means available to influence would-be exporters.
Another concern is the possible negotiating burden if the MTCR is overloaded with up 
to 18 new or revised items. However, new items can be nested into the control definitions of 
larger classes of items. One possibility is to fill in the currently empty Item 5 with a new set 
of subitems, “penetration aids,” which could include some of the items suggested in this report.
The greatest difficulty will be obtaining the support of key governments for penaid export 
controls. The five nations defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear-armed 
states—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China—all have sophis-
ticated penaid programs. Modifications to the MTCR require the consensus of all 34 partners, 
including Russia but not China (which professes to observe a different form of the MTCR). 
Russia’s agreement is needed for MTCR modification, and China’s support is needed to avoid 
a serious loophole in penaid export controls. The example of Russian and Chinese super-
sonic low-altitude cruise missiles illustrates how serious this loophole could be. Although both 
Russia and China are acquiring missile defenses, their current objections to U.S. ballistic mis-
sile defenses might spill over into a reluctance to cooperate with controls that would reduce 









But will Russia and China cooperate? 
39 
Th is report illustrated how the MTCR Annex could be modifi ed to provide better controls on 
cruise missile and UAV penetration aids. If enacted, the MTCR modifi cations suggested here 
(and those in our previous report on ballistic missile penetration aids; see Speier, McMahon, 
and Nacouzi, 2014) would constitute one of the most signifi cant adjustments to the regime 
since its inception in 1987. Th e recommended modifi cations, or some variant of them, would 
strengthen the regime’s ability to impede the spread of increasingly lethal cruise missiles capa-
ble of penetrating missile defenses and delivering WMD.
Although policy considerations were beyond the scope of this research, moving a com-
plex regime modifi cation to fruition would obviously require careful diplomacy by the United 
States and like-minded governments. Several government offi  cials interviewed for this study 
have MTCR-related responsibilities and believe that such an eff ort would be worthwhile. Th e 
R
48    Cruise Missile Penaid Nonproliferation
recommended MTCR revisions would reinforce the effectiveness of U.S. and allied missile 
defenses, in turn bolstering protection and deterrence against missile-armed adversaries and 
enhancing international security.
The largest outstanding question is not the value of restrictions on penaid exports. It is 
whether Russia and China will support such restrictions.
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The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) becomes a greater threat when accompanied by the 
proliferation of effective means of delivery. The threat of one means of delivery, cruise missiles, will increase 
if proliferators can acquire effective countermeasures against missile defenses. Such countermeasures, when 
incorporated in an attacker’s missile, are known as penetration aids or penaids. As proliferator nations acquire 
ballistic and cruise missiles for this purpose, it will be important to establish effective measures to counter WMD 
attacks. This research was designed to assist U.S. agencies charged with generating policies to discourage 
the proliferation of WMD and cruise missile delivery systems, thereby strengthening deterrence. Speciﬁcally, 
it recommends controls on potential exports of penaid-related items according to the structure of the current 
international policy against missile proliferation, the Missile Technology Control Regime. The recommendations 
account for 18 classes of such items and are based on structured interviews with government and nongovernment 
experts, as well as an independent technical assessment to develop a preliminary characterization of the technologies 
and equipment most critical to the emerging penaid threat. The project also brought together a selected group of 
experts to participate in a workshop to review the initial characterization of penaid technologies and equipment. 
An earlier report by the same authors, Penaid Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of Countermeasures Against 
Ballistic Missile Defenses, presented a similar approach to controlling the proliferation of ballistic missile penaids.
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